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CAN MANDATORY JAIL LAWS DETER





The political climate of the 1980s in America has led to the view
that drunk driving is a violent crime, properly punishable with time
served in jail. This evolving viewpoint has led to a little-recognized
confrontation between the branches of government. Legislatures,
influenced by groups like Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD)
to view the behavior as extremely dangerous, have tried to force this
perception on a resistant judiciary. The judicial belief that in most
cases drunk driving is a none-too-dangerous traffic infraction results
from the experience of processing numerous cases in which no
harm resulted. Furthermore, judges face imperative demands to
move cases through the system by agreeing to reduced penalties for
guilty pleas. One outcome of this confrontation has been for legis-
latures to mandate jail sentences for convicted drunk drivers and to
prohibit plea bargaining as a means to avoid these sentences.
As of late 1988, mandatory jail for convicted drunk drivers had
become law in forty-two states in the case of repeat offenders and in
fourteen states for first offenders.' Typically, the mandatory incar-
ceration is for relatively brief periods, and some statutes permit sub-
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stitution of community service. 2 Despite the brevity of the jail
sentences and the occasional possibility of substituting community
service, these laws have been strongly supported as providing the
severity necessary for effective deterrence of drunk driving.
This support relies on the conventional belief in deterrence that
the threat of swift, certain, and severe punishment can reduce unde-
sirable behavior. The empirical evidence for the deterrent effective-
ness of severe penalties such as jail is, however, inconsistent at best.
In Norway and Sweden, where'drunk driving laws carrying jail pen-
alties have been in place for a half-century, there appears to be less
impaired driving than in many other Western countries,8 but Ross
4
has shown that the causal connection between these laws and low
rates of impaired driving is unproved in Scandinavia. Votey and
Shapiro, 5 in work intended to criticize Ross's position, conclude that
fines and license actions have been more effective than jail in pro-
ducing the Scandinavian results. In the United States, early studies
of severity-based drunk driving interventions all produced negative
findings.6 More recently, an evaluation of mandatory jail for first
offenders in the state of Tennessee found that, although implemen-
tation was relatively good, there was no significant change in either
awareness of the law or measures of the extent of drunk driving. 7
Similarly, a case study of an Ohio jurisdiction where the judge rou-
tinely sentences first-offense drunk drivers to jail found no evidence
of reduced drinking and driving even though the penalties were well
known among the citizens. 8
Two recent United States studies claim to have found evidence
2 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 9-11-3-4 (West 1983).
3 j. ANDENAES, THE SCANDINAVIAN EXPERIENCE IN SOCIAL CONTROL OF THE DRINKING
DRIVER 43-63 (M.D. Laurence, J.R. Snortum & F.E. Zimring eds. 1988); Ross, The Scandi-
navian Myth: The Effectiveness of Drinking-and-Driving Legislation in Sweden and Norway, 4J.
LEGAL STUD. 285 (1975).
4 Ross, supra note 3.
5 Votey & Shapiro, Highway Accidents in Sweden: Modeling the Process of Drunken Driving
Behavior and Control, 15 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 523 (1983).
6 SeeJ. GRUBE & K. KEARNEY, THE YAKIMA COUNTY DRINKING AND DRIVING PROJECT:
AN EVALUATION OF A MANDATORY JAIL SENTENCE AND A PUBLIC AWARENESS CAMPAIGN
(1980); Robertson, Rich, & Ross, Jail Sentences for Driving While Intoxicated in Chicago: A
Judicial Policy that Failed, 8 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 55 (1973); Voas, A Systems Approach to the
Development and Evaluation of Countermeasures Programs for the Drinking Driver, in PROCEED-
INGS OF THE FOURTH ANNUAL ALCOHOLISM CONFERENCE OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON
ALCOHOL ABUSE AND ALCOHOLISM 38-44 (Dep't of Health, Education and Welfare 1975).
7 R.K.JONES, H.C.JOKSCH,J.H. LACEY, & HJ. SCHMIDT, FINAL REPORT, FIELD EVALU-
ATION OF JAIL SANCTIONS FOR DWI (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
1988).
8 H.L. Ross & R. VOAS, THE NEW PHILADELPHIA STORY: THE EFFECTS OF SEVERE
PUNISHMENT FOR DRUNK DRIVING (AAA Foundation for Traffic Safety 1989).
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for a deterrent effect of mandatory jail laws. One instance involved
two independent analyses by Falkowski and by Cleary and Rodgers
of the impact of a policy by judges in Minneapolis which led to the
brief jailing of the vast majority of convicted drunk drivers in that
city.9 The evaluations found that nighttime fatal crashes-a gener-
ally accepted indicator of drunk driving--declined significantly near
the time of implementation of the jailing policy. Although reduc-
tions were also found statewide and in neighboring Ramsey County
(St. Paul), these were smaller than those in Hennepin County, where
the jailing policy was in effect. Confidence in these results must be
tempered by the fact that numerous other changes were made in the
drunk driving law at about the same time, which could have caused
the change. Moreover, in the Falkowski study, the crash reductions
appeared following an unexplained two-month delay beyond the
policy's inception.
A different kind of evidence favoring the deterrent effectiveness
ofjail comes from a cross-sectional study of state laws.' 0 The types
of law found effective by the research team included "illegal per se"
laws," administrative license-revocation laws, and mandatory-jail
laws. 12 The laws providing for mandatory jail terms were credited
with producing a six percent reduction in late-night fatal crashes.'
5
Although negative results were found in a similarly designed study
by Joksch, 14 the study by Zador and his colleagues seems to have
utilized more appropriate comparisons, and its results are more
credible.
In sum, the question of whether the threat of a mandatory brief
jail sentence can be effective in deterring drunk driving is an open
one. A majority of the individual case studies failed to find evidence
for effectiveness of jail, but two independent teams concluded that
9 C. FALKOWSKI, THE IMPACT OF Two DAY JAIL SENTENCES FOR DRUNK DRIVERS IN
HENNEPIN COUNTY, MINNESOTA (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 1984);
J. CLEARY & A. RODGERS, ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS OF RECENT CHANGES IN MINNESOTA'S
DWI LAws, PART III: LONGITUDINAL ANALYSIS OF THE POLICY IMPACTS (Minnesota House
of Representatives Research Department 1986).
10 P. ZADOR, A. LUND, M. FIELDS & K. WEINBERG, FATAL CRASH INVOLVEMENT AND
LAws AGAINST ALCOHOL IMPAIRED DRIVING (Insurance Institute for Highway Safety
1988).
11 Such laws criminalize not merely impaired driving, but driving while the level of
alcohol in the blood exceeds an arbitrary standard such as .10%. The blood alcohol
level is determined by a chemical test of blood or breath, such as the Breathalyzer test.
Such a law is intended to simplify and render more certain the prosecution of drunk
drivers.
12 P. ZADOR, A. LUND, M. FIELDS & K. WEINBERG, supra note 10.
13 Id.
14 H. JOKSCH, THE IMPACT OF SEVERE PENALTIES ON DRINKING AND DRIVING (1988)
(final report to MidAmerica Research Institute of New England).
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the Minneapolis judges may have achieved their goal, and the bet-
ter-designed of the national correlational analyses supports the de-
terrence predictions. This report adds to the literature evidence
from experience in another mandatory-jail jurisdiction, the state of
Arizona, since 1982.
II. THE ARIZONA CASE
In the context of drunk-driving laws prevailing at the time, the
Arizona law of 198215 appears to have been exceptionally severe. A
first-time offender, whether guilty of impaired driving (Section A) or
driving with a blood-alcohol level concentration (BAC) of more than
.10% (Section B, the illegal per se provision), was subject to a sen-
tence including a mandatory twenty-four hours in jail as well as a
$250 fine and a ninety-day license suspension.' 6 Further, second-
time offenders within three years faced sixty days in jail along with
fines and license actions, and third-time offenders faced six months
in jail along with other penalties.17 The law also prohibited plea
bargaining: if convicted, persons accused of drunk driving were to
be found guilty on the original charges.' 8 This would prevent an
offender's being charged merely with a first offense if arrested for
drunk driving on a subsequent occasion.
One formally trivial exception to the mandatory jail provision
eventually proved important. Judges were authorized upon the
prosecutor's recommendation to impose an alternative sentence for
first-time offenders who had inflicted no injury and whose BAC did
not exceed .207.19 This alternative avoided ajail commitment, and
although it included a fine and license suspension, the suspension
was fully imposed (or "hard") for only thirty days, following which
the offender had permission to drive for work-related purposes. In
order to limit resort to the alternative sentence, the legislature stip-
ulated that its use in any given case required the prosecutor's assent.
In 1984, the Arizona Supreme Court ruled on the constitution-
ality of the legislation in State v.Jones.2° The court held that the por-
tion of the 1982 law which made alternative sentencing dependent
upon the prosecutor's recommendation violated the principle of the
separation of powers in the Arizona constitution. 21 After Jones,
15 The Act was approved April 26, 1982. 1982 Ariz. Sess. Laws 716, ch. 234.
16 Id. at 723.
17 Id. at 724.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 723.
20 689 P.2d 561 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984).
21 Id. at 563.
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judges could actively use their discretion to pronounce alternative
sentences without prosecutorial assent. During the field work for
this study in the summer of 1986, the alternative sentence had be-
come routine for first-time-offender drunk drivers. Prosecutors and
defenders in the Phoenix courts estimated that up to 99% of con-
victed drunk drivers were avoiding jail sentences. Although the stat-
ute limited the alternative sentence to drivers with BACs less than
.20%, the courts reportedly widely violated this limitation and ap-
parently jailed only those offenders who were found to have been
"smart in the street" or whose cases involved "aggravating circum-
stances" such as reckless behavior.
The eventual failure to jail most offenders was not suspected at
the law's inception, however, and extensive publicity campaigns pre-
ceding and accompanying its enactment prominently highlighted
the mandatory jail sentence.22 Such media attention ought to have
increased the law's deterrent value, as deterrence theory premises
its prediction of behavior modification on the perceived severity,
certainty, and swiftness of the threatened punishment. If the gov-
ernment was able to convince the relevant public that a new law
would sharply increase punishment for drunk drivers, the legal
change should have produced a notable decline in the threatened
behavior. Although in time the courts extensively vitiated the
mandatory jail requirement, the Arizona law still furnishes an ap-
propriate case for investigating the ability of such threats to deter
drunk driving.
III. DATA AND ANALYSIS
As police know, the behavior of driving under the influence of
alcohol is not easy for persons outside the car to observe. There-
fore, the extent of drunk driving is difficult to measure directly.
Most research on drunk driving employs indirect or surrogate meas-
ures, such as nighttime fatalities. In many circumstances these are
the best available data. However, in recent years the federally-spon-
sored Fatal Accident Reporting System (FARS), based on blood-al-
cohol measures taken in fatal crashes, has provided a more valid
index. In areas where the testing of crash victims is fairly complete,
FARS data are the most useful measure for investigating the impact
of drunk driving countermeasures. 23
22 Epperlein, Initial Deterrent Effects of the Crackdown on Drinking Drivers in the State of
Arizona, 19 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 285-86, 289-90 (1987).
23 These data may be obtained, usually without charge, from the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration, Washington, D.C.
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We obtained FARS data for Maricopa County, Arizona-the
county including Phoenix and its suburbs-from the inception of
the system in 1980 through 1986. Nearly half the state's population
resides within this county, and the Phoenix courts had the reputa-
tion of being vigorous enforcers of the drunk driving legislation
from its inception. We also obtained data on the coverage of the
law by the principal Phoenix newspaper. We analyzed the data by
applying an interrupted time-series quasi-experimental research de-
sign in order to verify whether alcohol-related fatalities had de-
creased significantly at the time of the law's inception. Support for
this hypothesis would lend credibility to the idea that the mandatory
jail threat can deter drunk driving.
Table 1 summarizes our analysis. To measure the law's effect,
TABLE 1
SUMMARY OF INTERRUPTED TIME SERIES ANALYSIS OF THE
EFFECTS OF THE 1982 ARIZONA LAW AND ATTENDANT PUBLICITY
Interaction Residual
Model Law Effect Media Effect Effect Variance
Model 1 35.16
Model 2 -5.21 34.04
Model 3 -. 08 34.99
Model 4 5.74* -. 11 33.68
Model 5 9.88* -. 37 .34 33.09
* Statistically significant at p=0.05.
we created a model (Model 1)24 of the monthly time series of Mari-
copa County fatalities. Model 1 accounts for approximately 23% of
the variance in monthly fatalities as a function of seasonal variation
and stochastic drift. In other words, the observed data reflect the
fact that crashes are more frequent at some times of the year than at
others, and that there seems to be a long term decline in Maricopa
County fatalities, which is not uncommon in FARS data nationally.
Model 1, incorporating these phenomena, serves as a benchmark to
assess the impact of the 1982 law and its attendant publicity.
Model 225 incorporates a simple before-after variable to accom-
modate the hypothetical effect of the 1982 law. We found an appar-
ent intervention effect in the form of a reduction of slightly more
24 Parameter estimates and detailed statistics are given in the Technical Appendix.
See infra appendix.
25 See infra appendix.
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than five fatalities per month in the county, or a 17% reduction on
the base of approximately thirty fatalities per month before the law.
However, this reduction was not statistically significant; that is, we
could not say with assurance that the decline was anything other
than a random fluctuation in the series, like numerous other
monthly declines observed in its course. Put differently, Model 2
does not significantly improve over the knowledge base established
in Model 1, and cannot vouch for the effectiveness of the law.
Model 326 incorporates a measure of publicity-the number of
relevant articles published in the chief newspaper in the area, the
Arizona Republic. Surprisingly to us, the publicity effect was a reduc-
tion of less than one fatality per month, an effect which is neither
statistically nor substantively significant. Again, the information ac-
counted for in Model 3 provides no improvement over that con-
tained in Model 1: there is no evidence that publicity about the
mandatory jail law affected alcohol-related deaths.
Model 427 incorporates both the legal variable of Model 2 and
the publicity variable of Model 3. Controlling for publicity renders
the change associated with the law statistically significant, but the
improvement of Model 4 as a whole (including both the law and
publicity) over Model 1 (with no information about either) is not
statistically significant. Therefore, we cannot conclude that the data
provide any support for the proposition that even well-publicized
mandatory jail sentences are capable of reducing alcohol-related
crash fatalities. Model 528 incorporates the variables used in the
preceding models, adding an interaction term to allow for the possi-
bility of differences in their interrelations depending on background
variables. It leads to the same conclusions as the balance of the
analysis.
The analysis is handicapped because Maricopa County pro-
duces only a small number of fatalities. 29 This leads to a problem in
statistical power: if the law produced a real but small effect, it would
be hard to detect with our methods. A longer time series prior to
the law would help resolve this problem, but FARS data collection
began only in 1980. However, we can say confidently that if a deter-
rent effect sufficiently important to warrant the investment of major
legal resources had been present, the chances are good that we
would have seen evidence of it. Our best estimates do not support
26 See infra appendix.
27 See infra appendix.
28 See infra appendix.
29 The monthly number of vehicle-related fatalities in the entire state averages
around 70, and fewer than half of these occur in Maricopa County.
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the hopes and expectations on the part of citizen activists and
policymakers that led to the 1982 Arizona law.
The conclusion that the law very likely had no important deter-
rent effect is supported by evidence from an independent study,
published after our field work was done, which used state accident
files rather than FARS data and covered all of Arizona rather than
just Maricopa County.30 A score ofjudges, prosecutors, defense at-
torneys, court administrators, and other legal system personnel
whom we interviewed also concurred in the conclusion that no im-
portant benefits were achieved by the 1982 mandatory jail law.
IV. DiscussioN
In our opinion, the failure of the courts to implement the law as
intended is not a convincing explanation of its impotence. The leg-
islature indeed meant business. In the words of the Arizona drivers
license manual: "Get caught driving drunk in Arizona and you're
going to spend at least 24 hours injail .... You'll have your license
suspended for 90 days, too." Initial news stories assumed that jail
would be the routine penalty for drunk drivers, and we based our
theoretical expectation of deterrence on perceptions prevailing at
the inception of the law. We expected no delay for the deterrent
effect, if an effect did occur. TheJnes decision came two years after
the law's enactment. Moreover, even at the time of our field work in
1986, people we spoke with in the Phoenix legal community be-
lieved that most members of the public expected to be treated se-
verely when convicted of drunk driving. As one person put it: "It's
pitiful to hear them beg and plead .... They believe they've had it-
they're going to jail."
The failure to incarcerate, though notorious among informed
people, is probably not well known by ordinary drivers in Arizona
even today, and it was certainly not suspected in the early days of
the 1982 law. It cannot explain the law's failure to deter.
A more reasonable explanation lies in the possibility that the
public disregards threats when it perceives a negligible likelihood of
these threats being applied. The actual chances of apprehension for
a drunk driver in an American jurisdiction are estimated to range
between 1 in 200 and 1 in 2000.31 Hence, drivers who perceive a
severe punishment if caught, but a near-zero chance of being
30 Epperlein, supra note 22.
31 1 L. SUMMERS & D. HARRIS, NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION,
THE GENERAL DETERRENCE OF DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED (1978) (Technical Report
DOT-HS 803 582).
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caught, are being rational in ignoring the threat. We were unable to
find Maricopa County data directly on point, but a survey taken in
two rural Arizona counties in November 1982, shortly after the leg-
islature enacted the law, found that 25% of the respondents de-
scribed the probability of their being caught by the police when
driving drunk as either low or very low, and 15% thought that the
probability of being punished even if caught was low or very low.3 2
Although the majority professed other beliefs, it is possible that
the optimistic (and realistic) minority seeing relatively little risk
might ignore the new law. Moreover, this minority may be com-
prised of those people who are most in need of having their im-
pulses controlled by deterrent threats, yet who are at the same time
the most immune to the threats. Some research has found that
drunk drivers are disproportionately likely to be problem drinkers
and alcoholics, as well as young working-class men whose attitudes
towards compliance with law in general may be casual. As one state
safety official noted: "The thinking class drinks less, but the blue-
collar areas are untouched now." A traffic court judge added: "The
major effect has been on people who don't cause that many acci-
dents anyway .... [F]or the real problem drinker, nothing deters."
Another possible explanation for the failure of the law is that
members of the target population did not perceive it as severe. Jail
may be symbolically important to middle-class people, including the
vast bulk of members of citizen activist groups like MADD. How-
ever, defense attorneys in Phoenix often told us that the punishment
most threatening to their clients was not jail, but license suspension.
The effect of the 1982 law on this component of punishment for
drunk drivers is unclear, and it was not highlighted in publicity.
Many habitual drunk drivers may have viewed the 1982 law as con-
stituting less of a change than did the law's initiators and
supporters.
V. CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM EFFECTS
Our research also addressed the impact of a law mandating ex-
tensive use of jail on the operation of the Arizona criminal justice
system. Although the intent of the law was to increase sanction se-
verity, we expected defendants to increase their resistance to accu-
sations by obtaining counsel and demanding jury trials. We also
expected to find increasing burdens on prosecutors, courts, and
jails, due to an increasing case load.
32 M. Mykyta, Governor's Office of Highway Safety, Attitudes of Coconino and
Yavapai County Residents Toward Driving and Drinking (1982) (unpublished report).
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Had the law worked as planned, our initial expectations might
have been fulfilled amply. Indeed, effects were noted in the city of
Phoenix, where authorities enforced the law most strictly. The
Phoenix courts experienced a significant increase in trials, which
stretched available resources and resulted in lengthy delays for
processing offenders, thus paradoxically reducing the swiftness of
punishment for drunk driving in the attempt to increase its severity.
The "durability" or time to conclusion of Phoenix drunk driving
cases doubled in the first two years of the law. By November, 1984,
1,500 cases were awaiting trial in the city. Four additional tempo-
rary courtrooms were added in November and December of that
year, and two of these were made permanent in the following sum-
mer. Although the claim of a state official that "the Phoenix courts
are destroyed" seems excessive, the future remains hostage to the
investment decisions of defendants and their lawyers, whose cases
and fees dramatically increased after 1982.
In other communities, where enthusiasm for the law appears to
have been less vigorous, prosecutors allegedly offered to drop
drunk driving charges on grounds of insufficient evidence and to
accept guilty pleas to collateral offenses that would not result in the
loss of a license. Such plea bargains would also conceal repeat-
offender status in the event of a rearrest. We heard no reports of
increased numbers of trials outside of Phoenix.
Delay in the Phoenix courts threatened Arizona's compliance
with federal regulations requiring swiftness in handling drunk driv-
ing cases. The average time from arrest to conviction increased
from fifty-one days before the law to 108 days at the time of our
study, exceeding the United States Department of Transportation
guideline of ninety days and incurring the possibility of reduced fed-
eral highway subsidies. In order to counter the backlog, the state
legislature passed administrative per se legislation, which had the ef-
fect of shifting the most feared sanctions from the criminal process
to the administrative one, and diminishing the usefulness of de-
manding ajury trial in the vast majority of cases where a possible jail
sentence was not at issue.33
In light of the near-universal use of the alternative sentence, it
is hardly surprising that the 1982 law had little impact on Arizona
jails. Officials of the Phoenix jail had been warned to expect large
numbers of new, short-term inmates on top of the 3000 prisoners
normally in custody each day, but these expectations diminished
with the passage of time. According to a spokesman for the Mar-
33 ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-694 (1987).
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copa County Sheriff: "Initially we were told to expect an increase in
jail population of 1000 a day. This was modified as things settled
down to a prediction of 100 a day. We think the impact has been
much less, but the public is probably not aware of this." If drunk
drivers face jail in Phoenix or elsewhere in Arizona today, it is most
likely to be in the hours immediately following arrest, during book-
ing, rather than as a consequence of a post-trial sentence.
VI. CONCLUSION
Increasing the severity of threatened punishment for drunk
drivers through mandatory jail sentences does not appear to have
been a successful deterrent in Arizona. We found no significant re-
duction in the measure of drunk driving when the law was imple-
mented. It is possible that the threatened punishment lacked
credibility because of a low perceived probability of its implementa-
tion. Another possibility is that a day in jail was not regarded as
severe punishment by the relevant population, those who drive
while impaired, especially as compared with the alternative of li-
cense actions. The problems of obtaining deterrent effects using jail
have been confirmed in other research,3 4 and these results, though
unexpected by some people, are not surprising.
The relatively restricted consequences of the 1982 Arizona law
for the criminal justice system of the state testify to the lack of im-
plementation. In Phoenix, where commitment to applying the pen-
alties was strongest, the need for additional resources for
prosecuting offenders led to unacceptable reductions in the swift-
ness of punishment, and eventually to the need for legislation shift-
ing the locus of important penalties from the criminal to the
administrative process.
We have tried to speculate about the reasons for the failure of
the Arizona law, with its attendant publicity, to reduce drunk driv-
ing. Whether or not we have succeeded in our explanation, it is
clear that the evidence does not support the validity of deterrent
expectations for a policy of mandatory jail for drunk drivers. This
finding confirms those of several other studies and reinforces the
balance of evidence against deterrence in this kind of situation. It
may serve to caution those who would further extend the use ofjail
sentences for drunk drivers. A jailing policy can perhaps be de-
fended on the grounds that drunk drivers deserve punishment. It
cannot be defended on the grounds that punishing them severely
will save the lives of others.
34 Nichols & Ross, supra note 1.
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1-12 .34 .27 .44 .44 .16 .25 .39 .15 -. 01 .29 .15 -. 04
ST.E. .12 .13 .14 .16 .17 .17 .18 .19 .19 .19 .20 .20
Q 8.5 13.9 28.9 44.3 46.4 51.4 64.1 66.1 66.1 73.4 75.3 75.5
13-24 .08 .02 -. 14 -. 08 -. 04 -. 18 -. 24 -. 05 -. 21 -. 35 -. 19 -. 08
ST.E .20 .20 .20 .20 .20 .20 .21 .21 .21 .21 .22 .22
Q 76.1 76.2 77.9 78.5 78.6 81.9 87.9 88.1 92.9 106 110 110
First Differences
1-12 -. 46 -. 18 .13 .22 -. 28 -. 03 .29 -. 07 -. 35 .34 .02 -. 24
ST.E. .12 .14 .14 .15 .15 .16 .16 .17 .17 .18 .18 .18
Q 15.5 17.9 19.2 22.9 29.2 29.3 35.9 36.3 46.3 56.3 56.4 61.6
13-24 .15 .08 -. 17 .02 .14 -. 07 -. 20 .29 -. 03 -. 22 .04 .28
ST.E .19 .19 .19 .19 .19 .19 .20 .20 .20 .20 .21 .21
Q 63.5 64.1 66.8 66.9 68.8 69.2 73.3 82.1 82.2 87.2 87.3 96.1
Third Differences
1-12 -. 06 .02 -. 28 .19 -. 04 .07 -. 00 -. 03 -. 25 .09 .06 .03
ST.E. .12 .12 .12 .13 .13 .13 .13 .13 .13 .14 .14 .14
Q .3 .3 6.2 9.0 9.1 9.5 9.5 9.5 14.7 15.4 15.7 15.8
13-24 -. 03 -. 03 -. 02 .03 -. 06 -. 01 -. 06 .18 -. 10 -. 07 -. 07 .25
ST.E. .14 .14 .14 .14 .14 .14 .14 .14 .15 .15 .15 .15
Q 15.9 15.9 16.0 16.1 16A 16.4 16.7 '19.9 21.0 21.4 22.0 28.7
Fourth Differences
1-12 .05 .00 .18 -. 16 .02 -. 02 .15 -. 12 -. 31 .24 .01 -. 21
ST.E. .12 .12 .12 .13 .13 .13 .13 .13 .13 .14 .15 .15
Q .2 .2 2.6 4A 4.4 4.4 6.2 7.4 15.1 19.8' 19.8 23.5
13-24 .21 -. 04 -. 14 -. 04 .05 -. 02 -. 12 .11 .04 -. 20 .10 .18
ST.E. .15 .16 .16 .16 .16 .16 .16 .16 .16 .16 .17 .17
Q 27.3 27.5 29.3 29.5 29.7 29.7 31.2 32.3 32.4 36.4 37.4 41.1
Sixth Differences
1-12 .08 -. 07 .32 .28 -. 09 -. 26 .20 .02 -. 25 .08 .05 -. 14
ST.E. .12 .12 .12 .14 .14 .15 .15 .16 .16 .16 .16 .16
Q .5 .8 7.9 13.6 14.2 19.3 22A 22.4 27.3 27.8 28.0 29.6
13-24 .04 -. 08 -. 02 -. 02 -. 00 -. 14 -. 11 .15 -. 01 -. 23 .08 .19
ST.E. .16 .17 .17 .17 .17 .17 .17 .17 .17 .17 .18 .18
Q 29.7 30.3 30.3 30.3 30.4 32.3 33.5 35.8 35.9 41.1 41.8 45.6
Twelfth Differences
1-12 23 .12 .55 .39 .03 .26 .38 -. 08 -. 11 .31 -. 00 -A1
ST.E. .13 .14 .14 .17 .18 .19 .19 .20 .20 .20 .21 .21
Q 3.3 4.2 24.1 34.4 34.4 39.0 48.9 49.4 50.2 57.4 57A 70.2
13-24 .10 -. 01 -. 24 -. 14 .04 -. 25 -. 31 .04 -. 12 -. 36 -. 14 -. 05
ST.E. .22 .23 .23 .23 .23 .23 .24 .24 .24 .24 .25 .25
Q 70.9 71.0 75.5 77.2 77.3 82.7 91.2 91.4 92.9 105 108 108
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MODEL (1) - No EFFECT
PARAMETER VARIABLE NUM./ STD T
LABEL NAME DENOM. FACTOR ORDER VALUE ERROR VALUE
1 C CNST 1 0 -. 0883 .3881 -. 23
2 TH3 FATALS MA 1 3 .4312 .1019 4.23
3 TH4 FATALS MA 1 4 -. 2722 .1000 -2.72
4 TH9 FATALS MA 1 9 .3441 .1106 3.11
TOTAL SUM OF SQUARES .................. 326632E+04
TOTAL NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS ....... 72
RESIDUAL SUM OF SQUARES ................ 242606E+04
R-SQUARE ................................ .. 225
EFFECTIVE NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS ... 69
RESIDUAL VARIANCE ESTIMATE ............ 351603E+02
RESIDUAL STANDARD ERROR ............... 592962E+01
Residual Autocorrelation Function
1-12 .10 .10 -. 04 .06 .02 -. 06 .04 .01 -. 06 .12 .09 .04
ST.E. .12 .12 .12 .12 .12 .12 .12 .12 .12 .12 .13 .13
Q .7 1.5 1.6 1.9 1.9 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.6 3.8 4.5 4.6
13-24 .01 -. 05 .03 -. 02 -. 02 -. 05 -. 07 .09 -. 06 -. 10 .01 .20
ST.E. .13 .13 .13 .13 .13 .13 .13 .13 .13 .13 .13 .13
Q 4.6 4.9 4.9 5.0 5.0 5.3 5.8 6.5 6.9 7.8 7.9 12.1
MODEL (2) - LAW EFFECT
PARAMETER VARIABLE NUM./ STD T
LABEL NAME DENOM. FACTOR ORDER VALUE ERROR VALUE
1 C CNST 1 0 .1552 .3975 .39
2 W LAW NUM. 1 0 -5.2077 3.2763 -1.59
3 THE3 FATALS MA 1 3 .3970 .1009 3.93
4 THE4 FATALS MA 1 4 -. 2634 .0999 -2.64
5 THE9 FATALS MA 1 9 .4282 .1140 3.76
TOTAL SUM OF SQUARES .................. 326632E+04
TOTAL NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS ....... 72
RESIDUAL SUM OF SQUARES ................ 234888E+04
R-SQUARE ................................ .. 250
EFFECTIVE NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS ... 69
RESIDUAL VARIANCE ESTIMATE ............ 340418E+02
RESIDUAL STANDARD ERROR ............... 583453E+01
Residual Autocorrelation Function
1-12 .06 .09 -. 08 .06 .01 -. 06 .03 -. 01 -. 06 .08 .08 .05
ST.E. .12 .12 .12 .12 .12 .12 .12 .12 .12 .12 .12 .13
Q .3 .8 1.3 1.6 1.6 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.3 2.8 3.3 3.5
13-24 .02 -. 03 .07 -. 01 -. 02 -. 06 -. 04 .15 -. 02 -. 06 .01 .22
ST.E. .13 .13 .13 .13 .13 .13 .13 .13 .13 .13 .13 .13
Q 3.5 3.6 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.5 4.6 7.0 7.0 7.3 7.3 12.6
1990] MANDA TORYJAIL L4 WS 169
MODEL (3) - MEDIA EFFECT
PARAMETER VARIABLE NUM./ STD T
LABEL NAME DENOM. FACTOR ORDER VALUE ERROR VALUE
I C CNST 1 0 -. 0474 .4194 -. 11
2 V MEDIA NUM. 1 0 -0.756 .1350 -. 56
3 TH3 FATALS MA 1 3 A428 .1055 4.20
4 TH4 FATALS MA 1 4 -. 2854 .1075 -2.66
5 TH9 FATALS MA 1 9 .3291 .1109 2.97
TOTAL SUM OF SQUARES .................. 326632E+04
TOTAL NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS ....... 72
RESIDUAL SUM OF SQUARES ................ 241449E+04
R-SQUARE ................................. 229
EFFECTIVE NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS ... 69
RESIDUAL VARIANCE ESTIMATE ............ 349926E+02
RESIDUAL STANDARD ERROR ............... 591546E+01
Residual Autocorrelation Function
1-12 .11 .08 -. 04 .04 .02 -. 07 .02 .01 -. 07 .12 .09 .05
ST.E. .12 .12 .12 .12 .12 .12 .12 .12 .12 .12 .13 .13
Q .8 1.3 IA 1.5 1.5 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.3 3.5 4.2 4A
13-24 .01 -. 04 .04 -. 03 -. 04 -. 06 -. 09 .09 -. 06 -. 11 .03 .20
ST.E. .13 .13 .13 .13 .13 .13 .13 .13 .13 .13 .13 .13
Q 4.5 4.6 4.8 4.8 5.0 5.3 6.0 6.8 7.2 8.3 8.4 12.6
MODEL (4) - LAW EFFECT AND MEDIA EFFECT
PARAMETER VARIABLE NUM./ STD T
LABEL NAME DENOM. FACTOR ORDER VALUE ERROR VALUE
I C CNST 1 0 .2324 .3853 .60
2 W LAW NUM. 1 0 -5.7363 3.2797 -1.75
3 V MEDIA NUM. 1 0 -. 1100 .1323 -. 83
4 TH3 FATALS MA 1 3 .3802 .1013 3.75
5 TH4 FATALS MA 1 4 -. 2383 .1022 -2.33
6 TH9 FATALS MA 1 9 .4650 .1137 4.09
TOTAL SUM OF SQUARES .................. 326632E+04
TOTAL NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS ....... 72
RESIDUAL SUM OF SQUARES ................ 232380E+04
R-SQUARE ................................. 258
EFFECTIVE NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS ... 69
RESIDUAL VARIANCE ESTIMATE ............ 336783E+02
RESIDUAL STANDARD ERROR ............... 580330E+01
Residual Autocorrelation Function
1-12 .06 .05 -. 09 .06 .01 -. 07 .01 .00 -. 05 .08 .09 .06
ST.E. .12 .12 .12 .12 .12 .12 .12 .12 .12 .12 .12 .13
Q .3 .4 1.1 1.4 1.4 1.8 1.8 1.8 2.0 2.5 3.1 3.5
13-24 .02 -. 03 .09 -. 00 -. 04 -. 07 -. 05 .16 -. 02 -. 06 .01 .22
ST.E. .13 .13 .13 .13 .13 .13 .13 .13 .13 .13 .13 .13
Q 3.5 3.6 4.3 4.3 4.5 5.0 5.2 7.7 7.8 8.1 8.1 13A
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MODEL (5) - LAw EFFECT, MEDIA EFFECT AND INTERACTION
PARAMETER VARIABLE NUM./ STD T
LABEL NAME DENOM. FACTOR ORDER VALUE ERROR VALUE
1 C CNST 1 0 .3547 .3592 .99
2 W LAW NUM. 1 0 -9.8843 4.7347 -2.09
3 V MEDIA NUM. 1 0 -. 3737 .2672 -1.40
4 U INTER NUM. 1 0 .3381 .3058 1.11
5 TH3 FATALS MA 1 3 .3403 .0953 3.57
6 TH4 FATALS MA 1 4 -. 1898 .0916 -2.07
7 TH9 FATALS MA 1 9 .5355 .1100 4.87
TOTAL SUM OF SQUARES .................. 326632E+04
TOTAL NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS ....... 72
RESIDUAL SUM OF SQUARES ................ 228324E+04
R-SQUARE ................................ .. 271
EFFECTIVE NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS ... 69
RESIDUAL VARIANCE ESTIMATE ............ 330904E+02
RESIDUAL STANDARD ERROR ............... 575242E+01
Residual Autocorrelation Function
1-12 .04 .02 -. 10 .06 -. 01 -. 13 -. 00 -. 01 -. 02 .05 .07 .09
ST.E. .12 .12 .12 .12 .12 .12 .12 .12 .12 .12 .12 .13
Q .1 .2 1.0 1.2 1.2 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.7 3.1 3.7
13-24 .06 -. 02 .07 -. 03 -. 02 -. 07 -. 05 .14 -. 01 -. 01 .03 .23
ST.E. .13 .13 .13 .13 .13 .13 .13 .13 .13 .13 .13 .13
Q 4.1 4.1 4.5 4.6 4.7 5.2 5.5 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.5 13.5
